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by 
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Assumption College 
Worcester, Massachusetts 
In the event of a power failure in the twentieth century it is, for many, as if time 
comes to a halt and one is stripped naked - stripped, that is, of all the modem 
accoutrements that have become as much a part of one's life as one's own 
clothing and reduced to "primitive" - some would 'say unbearable -
conditions. And yet a power failure is also an opportunity to face one's own 
bumanity in quiet and darkness. One of my favorite activities during a power 
failure is thinking about people like Plato, Aristotle, Augustine, Maimonides, 
Thomas Aquinas, and other great thinkers whose living conditions were much 
like those during our modem power failures and yet whose accomplishments in 
such conditions surpass those of most of us even with our heat, electricity, and 
running water. 
Human beings are remarkably adjustable. Over the past three hundred years 
we have adapted to modem science and technology so amenably and have 
become so easygoing about it that we find it difficult to imagine how anyone 
could have lived without it. At the same time, however, we also tend to be 
generally unconscious of the impact of modem science and technology on the 
very meaning of living humanly. 
This is particularly the case in the field of medicine and health care. We tend to 
forget, for example, that the first accurate knowledge of human anatomy came 
only in the sixteenth century, that the discovery of the circulation of the blood 
emerged in the seventeenth century, the anatomical concept of disease in the 
eighteenth century, and anesthesia in the nineteenth century. It boggles the mind 
to consider the fact that for the overwhelmingly greater portion of history the 
human race did without what we regard as the elementary fixtures of medicine 
and health care. 1 
Yet all of this pales into insignificance in the light of developments in the 
twentieth century; for there have been more developments in medicine and 
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health care in the past fifty years than in all previous time. To cite just a few 
examples, consider organ transplants, asexual reproduction, and genetic 
engineering. And yet, considering the pace of these and other developments as 
well as their seeming direction toward something like Huxley's Brave New 
World, we find ourselves in the unenviable position of wondering whether, to 
cite a popular song, "these are the good old days," or whether we should think of 
the time in which we live in terms of the ancient Chinese curse, "may you live in 
interesting times."2 
By this I mean that, by and large, the rapid pace of sophisticated developments 
in medicine and health care have knocked the moral breath out of us. 
Unprecedented questions about birth, death, the very meaning of health care, the 
very profession of health care, and about humanity itself, race well beyond our 
groping specUlations. And as we stop to catch our breath, we find ourselves at a 
pivotal fork on the road. 
Many, it seems, have already chosen the path of least resistance: the road, 
originally charted by Rene Descartes and Francis Bacon, which promises "the 
relief of man's estate" and even immortality. The crucial difference, however, 
between Bacon and Descartes and those of us treading on this projected path is 
that these two thinkers were quite conscious of the human and moral cost of their 
ends: the reduction of nature to "unknowable stuff" to be conquered and 
engineered and the narrowing of the moral to the technically useful. We, in 
contrast, have been more mesmerized by new and sophisticated means than 
conscientious about modem utopian ends; and with the tunnel vision and ethical 
"tools" they and their intellectual progeny have bequeathed to us and that 
accommodate their ends, we move along that path,justifying whatever we have 
already adapted to or have already willed in our heart of hearts.3 
"Will" is a key word here. At the foundations ofthe modem project of Bacon 
and Descartes is the dogmatic rejection of the view that nature provides a 
purposive design discoverable by one who would make the effort to contemplate, 
receive, or "listen" to it. 
On the contrary, Roman Catholic theology has prided itself in having a strong 
and coherent "creation theology," due chiefly to the efforts of St. Thomas 
Aquinas. Nature was a principal focus of theological contemplation; and this 
contemplation yielded significant results in the field of moral theology. Truth to 
tell, however, Thomism, from the sixteenth century to the present time, has done 
more to obfuscate - and even distort - than transmit accurately Thomas' 
original insights about nature. Much of this distortion was due to the influence of 
modernity's posture of distrust of nature, its consequent tum to epistemology, the 
eventual separation of rationality from distrusted nature in the eighteenth 
century, and finally the distrust of rationality itself, the rise of historical 
consciousness, and the final triumph of the will.4 
We are further away from "listening" to nature than ever before. And this is 
continuing to have its effect on Catholic moral theology. But we do not 
necessarily have to resign ourselves to the Cartesian and Baconian path of least 
resistance. At that pivotal fork on the road, there is an alternative path, a steeper, 
slower going, but not impossible pathway to the recovery of the human ability to 
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"listen" to nature's design. We know it's not impossible because Dr. Leon Kass 
has been travelling on that path for some time. He can assist us as a steady and 
reliable guide. 
An examination of Dr. Kass' thinking about three particular topics, 1) the 
approach of contemporary medical and health care ethics in general, 2) the plight 
of the Hippocratic Oath, and 3) the question and direction of asexual 
reproduction will serve to illustrate how Dr. Kass' thoughtful "listening" to 
nature can assist Catholic theology'S retrieval of its wisdom about the order of 
creation as well as the light this wisdom can shed on medicine, health care, and 
bioethics. S 
Contemporary Medical and Health Care Ethics: 
"Where's the Action?'" 
It is not surprising that, with all of the developments in medicine and health 
care in the past fifty years or so, medical and health care ethics and bioethics have 
become important, even fashionable, fields of study and discourse. But one can 
reasonably wonder: what have the practitioners in these fields actually 
accomplished? Where is it all going? And can we honestly say that, as a result of 
our efforts in these fields, doctors, nurses, and other health professionals, and 
health facilities are better today?' (By "better" I don't simply mean more 
competent; I also mean better in the moral sense: prudent and virtuous.) 
In a contemporary textbook on bioethics, after reviewing the various ethical 
methods being used today (consequentialism, deontologism, intuitionism, rights 
ethics), the author concludes: 
As you read this book and discuss the problems contained in it, you will find yourself 
using one or more of these methods in trying to convince yourself or others of the 
correctness of a particular position. You may also find it interesting to adopt one method 
to see how it works and where it will lead you. Discovering which method you are more 
comfortable with and being attentive to the methods others are using is a first step toward 
gaining clarity in one's discussions and debates about complex medica1-ethical 
dilemmas.8 
This author, and many others like him, view ethics as fundamentally a matter 
of method - a matter of how. The question of what or why is either secondary or 
is something that has already been willed. In the latter case, the ethical method 
becomes simply a way ofjustifying what has already been willed; and if one finds 
the method that can justify what one has already willed, then, of course, one can 
be "comfortable" with it. To draw an analogy with the "quick fix" of Huxley's 
Brave New World, ethics becomes a kind of intellectual "soma." Ethics becomes 
a matter of applying one's favorite theory to various ethical problems. Leon Kass 
calls this approach "ethics as theory with application.''9 I call it "tool box ethics." 
There are three basic problems with this approach. First, its presupposition is 
that medical practice is not inherently an ethical matter; that moral guidance is 
nowhere to be found from within the very meaning and activity of the art of 
healing; and that, therefore, a "theory" or set of concepts must be imported and 
applied from the outside to "save" the medical profession. lo Second, there is 
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the danger, to which I alluded earlier, that ethics becomes a matter of 
rationalization in service to the goal one has already willed, either quite publicly 
or quite secretly and therefore quite deceptively. Third, and perhaps most 
important of all- because it undergirds the previous two problems - is that this 
approach to ethics requires no moral investment on the part of either its 
practitioners or the health care professionals to whose work it is applied. In its 
tendency to provide solutions in the form of rules or by way of rationalistic 
devotion to ideals such as "autonomy" or "personhood," "tool box ethics" fails to 
address "the direct but unreflective education of our loves and hates, our 
pleasures and pains, gained only in practice, through habituation and by means of 
praise and blame, reward and punisbment,"ll in short, those powers ofthe soul 
that are not intrinsically rational but have the potential to be trained to listen to 
reason. 12 But lacking this training, and as Kass puts it, why should motive care to 
listen to speech? Why should appetite allow itself to be influenced by rules or 
ideals?13 
Ethics as theory with application abstracts from the passions and appetite of 
human beings, and therefore does not speak to their hearts. Nor is it particularly 
respectful of the concrete fact that, no matter how many theories, methods, and 
ethics committees that can be mustered up, there is absolutely no substitute for 
the on-the-spot prudential judgement on the part of the health care professional. 14 
In short, ethics as theory with application reduces ethics to the enterprise of 
solving moral problems in a technical way. Because it fundamentally abstracts 
from human nature, "tool box ethics" is far away from recognizing that the 
fundamental issue in medicine and health care is the health care professional 
himself, including head, heart, and hand; mind, appetite, and action; and their 
perfection is prudence, moral character, and competence. IS 
Against the steady stream of ethics as theory with application, Leon Kass 
speaks about ethics as practice with reflection. This approach to ethics antedates 
by centuries ethics as theory with application, and it was the principal focus of 
traditional medical ethics. Ethics as practice with reflection is a matter oflistening 
to human nature, not only in terms of doing, but also in terms of being. It is a 
matter of thoughtful doing, leading to a "grown-togetherness of appetite and 
mind."16 It is a matter of reflecting on one's practice and then asking: what kind of 
a human being must I be to know and to do what is right, and to do it well? This 
approach to ethics requires that one be, not only a knower of one's practice, but 
also a knower of one's soul. "Tool box ethics" abstracts from both of these. Ethics 
as practice with reflection focuses precisely on where the action is, internally and 
externally. 17 
The Hippocratic Oath and the Covenantal Nature of the Art of Healing 
An approach to medical ethics that parallels Kass' ethics as practice with 
reflection is Protestant theologian William F. May's ethics as corrective vision. In 
his book, The Physician's Covenan~ May explains that the behaviour and 
practice of the physician is both shaped by and reflective of a certain image. This 
image, in tum, is demiurgic in that it shapes the way in which patients respond 
August, 1993 43 
or react to the physician. The goal of ethics as corrective vision is already implied 
in its name: to illumine the consciousness ofthe physician so that he can discover 
and understand his working self-image and how it shapes his very view of and 
approach to various medical issues.18 
It is noteworthy that while Kass appeals to Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics 
when explaining ethics as practice with reflection, May refers to the famous story 
of the cave as told by SocrateS in Plato's Republic. In his appeal to Aristotle, Kass 
highlights those powers of the soul that are to be found between the rational and 
vegetative powers, namely those passions and desires that have a natural 
"trainability" in the direction of moral as distinct from intellectual virtue. May, 
on the other hand, in his appeal to Socrates' story about the cave, wants to point 
to the role of reason in shedding light (or the "pure light of the sun" in Socrates' 
story) on the horizon as well as self-understanding (the "semi-darkened cave") of 
the physician. Plato's Socrates, it will be remembered, does not distinguish 
between moral and intellectual virtue. 19 
In keeping with this difference, whereas Kass begins with reflection on practice 
and then moves to self-understanding, May begins with illumining self-
understanding so as to shed corrective light on practice. 
The initial significance of these related differences is that it points out that Kass' 
approach takes the actual practice ofthe physician more concretely and therefore 
more seriously. Kass begins with reflection on medical practice on its own terms. 
It is more likely than May's approach to catch the ear, mind, and heart of the 
physician. May's approach is more deductive; he begins by positing specific 
images that he claims to be in competition in modern medicine. Before May can 
shed light on the self understanding of the physician, he must first make a case 
that these specific images, namely Parent, Fighter, and Technician, are the 
self-images of many - if not most - physicians. 
But the most important significance of these related differences between May 
and Kass revolves around their conflicting interpretations of the Hippocratic Oath. 
Both May and Kass argue that the physician is by definition a teacher.20 So, for 
example, the physician ought to instruct his patient about and exhort him to 
embraces proper habits of health. A physician ought to do this in ways with 
words that prudently and effectively enlighten and move his patient. But this, of 
course, requires that the physician truly listen to his patient. 
Kass would agree with May's point that no one of the images - Parent, 
Fighter, and Technician - nor all three together, can adequately or consistently 
embrace the self-understanding ofthe physician as teacher. Moreover, while each 
of these images do reflect certain positive characteristics of the physician (the 
providential and nurturing Parent; the Fighter who takes suffering and death 
seriously; the competent Technician who maintains professional distance), no 
one of these images can adequately or consistently embrace all of the positive 
characteristics of all three images. In fact, when left to themselves, these images 
tend to degenerate: Parent into a suffocating and authoritarian paternalist that 
treats the patient as child, or even worse, as property; Fighter into a soldier 
waging an unconditional war against disease and death on the battleground that 
is the patient; and Technician into a tradesman who sells his services on 
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contract to the patientlconsumer.21 
What does it take to prevent this kind of degeneration, to preserve whatever 
positive characteristics each of these images reflects and to embrace that, at the 
core of his self understanding, the physician is a teacher? In answer to this 
question, May and Kass come to nearly the same conclusion, but in most 
surprising ways, and with a truly remarkable consequence. 
May argues that the physician must be covenanted. By covenanted May 
clearly means grounded in the unique Biblical ethic, either of Old Testament 
chesed or of New Testament agape. With either of these, the unique Biblical 
ethic is rooted fundamentally in the fact that one's self-identity is interrupted and 
reshaped by the divine primordial act of redeeming. This divine act leaves one 
overwhelmingly indebted, not simply individually, but as a member of a people, 
all of whom are also mutually indebted. The Biblical covenantal ethic, therefore, 
consists, not only of the recognition of this indebtedness at the core of one's 
identity, but also in the required response in kind, be it chesed or agape, to God 
and to others.22 
A covenanted physician recognizes that he stands side by side with the patient, 
mutually indebted and together indebted to the Redeemer. Like the Parent, the 
covenanted physician will nurture and provide, but will neither tend to replace 
Divine Providence with a providence of his own nor reduce the patient to 
property. On the contrary, he will recognize that he and the patient are owned by 
Someone Else. Like the Fighter, the covenanted physician will take suffering and 
death seriously, but will refrain from waging an unconditional war against death 
because of his recognition that death is not the greatest evil. Finally, like the 
Technician, the covenanted physician will foster competence, but not at the cost 
of his own moral and spiritual health, and not at the expense of reducing 
covenantal indebtedness to an external contract of mutual rights. Unlike the 
Technician, the covenanted physician is not fearful of ties with patients because 
all human ties are subsumed and strengthened by the primordial tie with the 
Redeeming God.23 
Thus, according to May, only the covenanted physician is freed/rom all that 
weighs down the images of Parent, Fighter, and Technician, and freed/or going 
the extra mile in teaching the patient with a view to health.24 
In light of this covenantal ethic, William May is basically critical of the 
Hippocratic Oath.2s While he acknowledges that in the second paragraph of the 
Oath there is a recognition of the debt owed to one's teacher, there is no 
corresponding recognition of debt owed to one's patient. If, in the Oath, the 
relationship to one's teacher is covenantal, the relationship to one's patient is at 
best philanthropic. In May's view, the patient is on the periphery of the mind of 
the one who takes the Oath.26 
According to May, this philanthropic approach to the patient has led to the 
worst abuses and has consistently triggered angry reactions from patients. This 
philanthropic approach has led to the reduction of health care to a contract, 
according to which both physician and patient seek their own interest as well as 
protection, each from the other. Unlike covenantal indebtedness, which cuts 
through to the core of doctor and patient and unites each to the other, contract 
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governs only the external and divides each from the other.27 
As May views it, the ultimate reason for this danger inherent in the Hippocratic 
Oath is that, while indeed at the beginning and end of the Oath there is a 
recognition of the higher power upon which the art of healing depends, there is no 
recognition of any specific prior act ofthe divine which leaves both physician and 
patient mutually indebted. Lacking this, May claims, the Hippocratic Oath falls 
short of a covenantal ethic that is indispensable to the art of healing.28 
Yet why is it that Leon Kass consistently refers to the Hippocratic Oath as 
fundamentally covenantal in nature?29 As I will explain, the key reason is Kass' 
ability to "listen" to nature itself and on its own terms; and this, we noted, is what 
ethics as practice with reflection is about. 
According to Kass, the Hippocratic Oath is a comprehensive treatment of the 
perennial nature of the art of healing, namely, assisting nature's own inclination 
toward wholeness and working well. Lacking that natural inclination which we 
do not create but discover and presuppose, there would be no art of healing. And 
lacking that discovery of, continual "listening" to, and cooperation with that 
natural inclination, the art of healing loses its way.30 
Kass' careful reading reveals the Hippocratic Oath to be the result of its 
author's having discovered nature's inclination toward wholeness, and his having 
reflected upon what is essential as well as what is contrary to assisting that natural 
inclination and end, not only in terms of what one will and will not do or say to 
those who come for healing (paragraphs 3-7), and not only in terms of one's 
relationship to one's teachers (paragraph 2), but also in terms of one's 
dependence on the higher power which is the source of nature's inclination 
toward wholeness. Ethics as practice with reflection leads the author of the Oath 
to discover, not only that medical practice and the ethical "are as inseparable as 
the concave and the convex,"31 but also that the medical and the ethical, by their 
very nature, are grounded in an indebtedness to the divine. 
46 
A physician who could see through the trappings and equipment of his art to these native 
powers that make it possible would stand in the world neither as proud master nor as servile 
technician. He would stand seif<ansciously in between, as one who professes, respectfully 
affirming and gratefully acknowledging the existence and support of powers not of his own 
or of any human making. As a professional, man bears witness to the being of something 
higher and more enduring, participation in which can only be called a blessing.32 
Is it not simply wondrous, indeed awe-inspiring, that the living body contains an 
immanent power toward wholeness that acts on its own? . .. How come the world is full 
of plants that serve our needs? ... Is it man's doing that the world is full of all kinds of 
hidden healing aids, lying around to be discovered? The discoverer of a new drug, of 
course, deServes our praise. But what is owed for the fact that it was discoverable, that is, 
both intelligible and in the world, though hidden, accessible to being discovered? And 
finally, what about discovery itselrl ... Insight? Intuition? Utterly mysterious. One 
could do much worse than to credit some higher-than-human-power, not at our disposal 
or under our control ... One could do much worse than to credit Apollo, source of 
purity and holiness no less than of light and truth, perhaps because with the light to see 
the truth, and the truth about the whole, Apollo - or whatever its name is - brings 
wholeness 10 mind and us to wholeness, and further, in the art of medicine, brings us 
beyond awareness of wholeness 10 a divinelike overflowing inlo action, permitting us to 
help make Ihe wounded whole . .. The insight that drew the holy, the healthy, and the 
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whole from a common etymological root may point to the deepest wisdom, not only for 
medicine but perhaps also for how we are to live. (emphasis added)33 
In response to May's claim that the Hippocratic Oath makes no reference to a 
primordial divine act, Kass would point to the primordial and continuing divine 
act that is discernible to anyone who reflects on the nature of the art of healing. In 
terms that May would more readily appreciate, one could argue that May's 
emphasis on chesed and agape has been at the cost of neglecting the primordial 
and divine act of creating.34 
In response to May's claim that, in terms of the physician's relationship to the 
patient, the Hippocratic Oath is at best philanthropic, Kass would point out, not 
only that May underestimates and even misunderstands the philanthropic 
disposition, but also that the very nature of the art of healing demands no less of 
the physician than does chesed or agape. 35 
To defend this point, Kass would first call our attention to the Oath's second 
paragraph about one's relationship to one's teacher - by far the longest 
paragraph in the Oath - and particularly to the connection made between 
indebtedness to one's parents and indebtedness to one's teacher. As Kass puts it, 
. .. my parents gave me life, my teacher gave me my art. Or again, my parents gave me 
life, my teacher a way of life, itself dedicated to upholding the life of all.36 
This connection reminds the physician who takes the Oath, not only of his own 
mortality or of his indebtedness to those who gave him life and to those who 
taught him the art of healing, but also the responsibility, while participating in life 
and practicing the art of healing, of transmitting life as well as this art to posterity. 
Through his concern for his own immediate descendants, he learns concern for posterity 
in general, and therewith a concern for unrelated others. Through his covenant to uphold 
his teacher and to teach the young, he sustains the art in community, for only through the 
community can the art be transmitted. The physician stands in the world not as one who 
claims his rights or demands his due; rather he stands gratefully, thankful for the 
existence of the art of medicine, for the devotion of his teacher, for the community of 
like-minded healers, and for the privilege of sharing in this noble work. From gratitude 
for the gift of the art can flow more readily the disposition to give to others, in the first 
instance to those near and dear, but soon also in an overflow to others. The disposition of 
philanthropy can come only to those who know the love offew. Just as the family, when 
it does its proper work, is the nursery of these ethical sentiments, opinions, and 
dispositions, so the family ties of the art inculcate what the technical alone cannot: that 
philanthropic and virtuous disposition which makes one eager to serve those in need for 
the sheer goodness of doing so. One cannot attach the man to the best precepts of the 
mind except by first winning his heart.37 
Finally, Kass would point to the structure ofthe Hippocratic Oath and to the 
pivotal location of the longest paragraph about one's teacher. The Oath itself 
begins and ends with references to the divine; and the longest paragraph in which 
one's teacher is put on a par with one's parents mediates between reference to the 
divine and recognition of one's duties to one's patients. This structure of the 
allegedly noncovenantal Oath is remarkably parallel to the covenantal Ten 
Commandments, in which the duty to honor one's parents mediates between and 
connects duties to God and duties to others. In both the Hippocratic Oath and 
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the Ten Commandments, it is suggested that it is in filial piety that one first learns 
reverence and gratitude for and humility before the divine, human decency and 
dutifulness to others, and the intimate connection between the divine and the 
human.38 
In effect, whereas May claims that only a Biblical covenantal ethic - be it 
chesed or agape - can adequately and consistently call for the physician to be a 
teacher, Leon Kass discovers that nature itself, if "listened to," calls for nothing 
less. 
The implication, however, is not that we therefore don't need to heed the 
Biblical teaching, but rather that the Biblical covenantal teaching is intelligible to 
any thoughtful human being who would "listen" to nature. More specifically, 
what Christians call the order of creation already calls for the physician to be a 
covenanted teacher.39 
It is fascinating but not totally surprising that the word "nature" never once 
appears in William F. May's book. Historically, Protestant theologians have not 
been optimistic about "listening" to nature. But this lack of optimism has left 
Protestantism vulnerable to modernity's dogmatic refusal to "listen" to nature, to 
the consequent rise of historicism (which is essentially moral and intellectual 
deafness), and to the ultimate triumph of the will. 
But what reason can we find to explain Catholic theologians' lack of 
attentiveness to nature? At best, as I suggested earlier, and as Paul Ramsey has 
also pointed out, we have become the unwitting heirs of Bacon and Descartes. 
Like the Alphas, Betas, Gammas, and Epsilons of Huxley's Brave New World, 
we are intellectually and morally "bottled," taught to "hate nature" and to "love 
to consume," mesmerized by the "happiness" promised by Bacon and Descartes 
and already begun to be harvested. Thus, we have taken the path of least 
resistance and therefore, as World Controller Mustapha Mond of Brave New 
World puts it, we have no use for "old things" like the Hippocratic Oath. It 
doesn't speak to us because we can't hear it, because it's talking about nature. 
Is it any wonder, then, that we are on the threshold ofliterally bottling human 
nature or "manufacturing" babies? 
Engineering the Engineer: Asexual Reproduction 
Lenina Crowne is a "nurse" in the Fertilizing Room of the local decantation 
station in Brave New World Like everyone else in that World, Lenina has no 
lineage; she was engineered in the laboratory, decanted from a bottle, and "sleep 
taught" that sex is for play, and that the words, "mother" and "father," are 
obscenities. Is there any question as to what Lenina would think of Humanae 
Vitae, which warns against the idea of technically separating an openness to 
having babies from having sex, or of the 1987 Vatican Instruction on Bioethics, 
which warns against the idea of having babies without having sex? Of course, 
World Controller Mustapha Mond would never allow such obscene literature to 
circulate. Such literature would be safely locked in his safe along with the Bible 
and Shakespeare, or one would have to travel to the "savage reservation" to read 
them. 
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Humanae Vitae and the Vatican Instruction on Bioethics are; of course, very 
much related. Both speak about the nature of the conjugal or marital act and its 
intrinsic unitive and procreative meanings, and both teach that the artificial 
separation of one from the other is a violation of the objective moral order. Both 
documents recognize as morally permissible the intervention of human 
intelligence in the regulation as well as the promotion of human birth, as long as 
this intervention assists and does not frustrate the design ordained by the Creator 
for the transmission of human life, that is, as long as we remain faithful to our role 
of intelligent ministers of that design and not seek to be its arbiters. 
Thus, in the matter of the regulation of human birth, responsible parenthood 
requires "listening" to and collaborating with rather than frustrating or 
engineering nature, specifically the rhythms of fecundity inscribed in human 
nature. The recognition that such "listening" and collaborating require prudence 
and moral virtue flows from ethics as practice with reflection on the part of 
husband and wife. This disposition is fundamentally different from the 
contraceptive mentality, which is accommodating to resolving a moral problem 
in a technical way, and which does not required such "listening" and 
collaborating, let alone prudence and moral virtue. In short, the pill is to Bacon's 
notion of nature as unknowable "stuff' to be engineered what responsible 
parenthood is to the Creator's purposive design in nature for the transmission of 
human life as well as for the regulation of human births. 
With regard to the promotion of human birth in cases of infertility among 
married couples, responsible parenthood would include the consideration of and 
possible recourse to technologies that assist but do not substitute for the marital 
act. Responsible parenthood recognizes that sexual loving is as humanly 
indispensable to husband and wife as it is the only appropriate origin of human 
life. 
How do we Catholics respond to these teachings? Fortunately, we are not the 
likes of Lenina Crowne; but we do have our RU 486, Norplant, and state of the 
art in vitro fertilization. And with them, how far away are we from the 
Malthusian Drills and Fertilizing Room of Brave New World? And now that we 
have them, how could we possibly live without them? And now that we have 
them, we want them. We will them. And having willed them, shall we take a little 
"intellectual soma" by resorting to a "methodology" that we can be comfortable 
with - comfortable because it will serve nicely to justify what we have already 
willed? 
And so we ask: what real difference is there between contraception and natural 
family planning? After all, isn't there a circumvention of nature in both cases? 
And isn't the goal the same in each case? What if a couple is poor and cannot 
afford to have more children? What if a woman cannot possibly survive another 
pregnancy? What if a retarded young woman might be sexually abused on her 
way to or back from school? And what's so wrong about helping a married 
couple fulfill their longing for a child of their own? Why is adopting children 
permissible and in vitro fertilization not? In neither case is the child the fruit of the 
sexual loving between husband and wife. 
We want it. We will it. We can't live without it. In each and every specific case, 
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a defense and justification of the technologies in question is easily provided by the 
most human, even charitable intentions. Remember the path of least resistance, 
originally charted by Francis Bacon and Rene' Descartes for the humane goal of 
the "relief of man's estate." But isn't this path in fact the way, "defensible step by 
defensible step,"40 to Brave New World? It is precisely this question which Leon 
Kass addresses in his chapter, "Making Babies: the New Biology and the 'Old 
Morality'."41 
When presenting his views, Kass obviously has no authority that binds his 
readers to submit to his teaching. In addition, although far from being hostile or 
even indifferent to matters religious, Leon Kass does not profess faith in the God 
of the Bible; and clearly does not base his reasoning on such faith. At best, Leon 
Kass can only hope to persuade his readers with his own argumentation. 
But if these are in any way liabilities, in this case, they tum out to be to his 
advantage. The name of Cardinal Ratzinger, or more generally any reference to 
the Magisterium of the Church, associated in the minds of many with narrowness 
and negativity, deafens many to the substance of the Vatican Instruction on 
Bioethics. In addition, the forthright and authoritative manner in which Cardinal 
Ratzinger writes the Instruction is offensive to anyone for whom authority as 
such is necessarily a slight to one's intelligence. So, in spite of the fact that the 
Church's Magisterium has been "listening" to the Creator's design in nature for 
centuries, it all goes to waste for many readers. When addressing the issue of 
asexual reproduction, Kass is free of all these complications. So also is the reader 
who considers Kass' thinking. Thus, Kass is freer and perhaps more capable of 
getting into the minds of his readers and, in a politic but principled manner, of 
awakening them to the need to "listen" to nature. 
In his chapter, Kass proceeds slowly ·and cautiously, explicitly conceding that 
it is, from the very beginning, an uphill task to change the mind of anyone who is 
convinced that in vitro fertilization is not only morally justifiable but also 
eminently beneficial to humanity. Kass acknowledges that, for the most part, he 
is addressing the mindset that considers morality a matter of good and bad 
intentions and short term risks, harms, and benefits. He knows that he can hardly 
expect to captivate his audience by speaking about the intrinsically moral or 
immoral. Such speech annoys and even insults the mindset according to which 
knowing something is making, changing, or conquering something, and not at all 
a matter of discovering what does not change. 
Thus, Kass begins by playing the role of a gadfly. He moves the reader first to 
wonder about the very terms that are often used to describe infertility and to 
justify a married couple's resorting to in vitro fertilization. Specifically he asks if it 
is accurate to refer to infertility as a disease; and he alerts the reader to the dangers 
of speaking of the right to a child of one's own. In each case he notes that such 
language, which points to possession or properties of individuals, conflicts with 
both the fact that fertility is a relationship as much as a condition - a relationship 
between husband and wife and also between generations-, and that the 
meaning of childbearing and its bond to the covenant of marriage can hardly ~ 
reduced of individual rights. Besides, how far would a right to a child of one's 
own extend? Would such a right extend to any and all technologies that 
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could potentially deliver the child? Would such a right extend to technologies 
that are yet to be developed? Is our willing something sufficient basis for our 
having a right to it, as well as to any and all means to attaining that something']42 
Leaving aside the language of "disease" and "rights," Kass asks what could be 
wrong with in vitro fertilization to overcome infertility among married couples? 
Isn't intramarital in vitro fertilization ethically similar to artificial insemination by 
the husband? It would seem so, except that there is an alternative to in vitro 
fertilization, namely, oviduct reconstruction. Indeed, oviduct reconstruction is 
preferable to in vitro fertilization on the grounds that the least objectionable 
means is preferable to achieve the same unobjectionable end. Unlike in vitro 
fertilization, oviduct reconstruction does not involve the deliberate manipulation 
of the embryo, and does not pose any risks to the embryo in terms of deformity, 
retardation, or damage by genetic tests.43 
Are these risks a sufficient basis for ruling out intramarital in vitro fertilization? 
Paul Ramsey thought so. According to Ramsey, total and permanent abstention 
from in vitro fertilization is in order because, given the risks, we cannot ethically 
get to know if it is something we should practice.44 
But hasn't there been genuine success in recent years? And haven't the 
warnings about these risks been proven false prophecies? Besides, "if we have 
children for our children, and not for ourselves {to pass life on to the next 
generation)," or in other words, "ifthe gift oflife itself is a therapy, then could not 
the clear benefit to the child justify the risks so long as they are not excessive and 
are comparable to those in ordinary procreation?"4S 
Is there really any intrinsic moral reason to reject the intramarital use of in vitro 
fertilization? Kass says he finds none - "at least no reason that would not also 
rule out artificial insemination by the husband."46 But the careful reader might 
ask: might there be an intrinsic moral reason for rejecting both? However,just as 
soon as this question is raised, Kass rules out arguments concerning intrinsic 
rightness or wrongness because they abstract from the difficult task to which he 
beckons us next: "predicting and weighing consequences, often quite remote and 
intangible ones,"47 especially regarding the creating of embryos in the laboratory 
in the first place. And the reason for this sort of consideration is that " ... once 
introduced for the purpose of treating intramarital infertility, in vitro fertilization 
can now be used for any purpose:" extramarital fertilization, making pregnancy 
possible for women after menopause, surrogate mothering, the donation, sale, 
and banking of embryos, not to mention eugenics.48 
After weighing these Consequences, Kass expresses second thoughts about the 
wisdom of the practice of artificial insemination by husband in light of its 
growing uses for eugenics and surrogate gestation. (Remember the question: 
might there be an intrinsic moral reason for rejecting both in vitro fertilization and 
artificial insemination by husband?) 
.. .1 am no longer talking about the problem of misuse or abuse of a given technique, but 
rather about the fact that one technical advance makes possible the next and in more 
than one respect. The first serves as a precedent for the second, the second for the third 
-not just technologically but also in moral arguments. At least one good humanitarian 
ground can be found to justify each step. For these reasons, we must try to see more than 
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a few feet in front of us before we set forth.49 
Human procreation not only issues new human beings, it is itself a human activity (an 
activity of embodied men and women), The new forms of baby making .. . represent in 
themselves a radical change in human procreation as a human activity ... the new 
beginnings occur in a new locus, the laboratory, and involve a new partner, the scientist. 
Moreover, the techniques that at first serve merely to provide a child to a childless couple 
will soon be used to exert control over the quality of the child. A new image of human 
procreation has been conceived, and a new "scientific" obstetrics will usher it into 
existence. No more begetting or generating, procreating, or even reproducing; just plain 
producing or making, the attempt to supplant nature with rationality in the very mystery 
of life, all in the service of producing only wanted, willed, and flawless babies. The new 
reproduction shifts increasingly from home to laboratory, where it is transformed into 
manufacture. To repeat, increasing control over the product can only be purchased by 
increasing depersonalization of the process. In this continuum, artificial insemination 
represented the first step, genetic testing of embryos the second step, in vitro fertilization 
the third, and so on and on. 50 
In light of this forecast, Kass is then led to reconsider the old-fashioned 
alternative: 
Is there possibly some wisdom in the mystery of nature that joins the pleasure of sex, the 
inarticulate longing for union, the communication of love, and the deep and partly 
articulate desire for children in the very activity by which we continue the chain of 
existence? Is biological parenthood a built-in "device" selected to promote the adequate 
caring for posterity? Before we embark on new models of reproduction, we should 
consider the meaning of the union of sex,love, and procreation, and the meaning and the 
consequences of its cleavage. 51 
Where has Kass' reasoning taken us? He tells us that, when it comes to in vitro 
fertilization and artificial insemination by the husband, we ought to recognize 
that wisdom for us consists in not doing: 
I am aware that mine is, at least at first glance, not the most compassionate view 
(although it may very well turn out to be so in the long run). I am aware that there are 
some who now suffer who will not get relief should my view prevail. Nevertheless, we 
must measure the cost - and I do not mean the financial cost - of seeking to eradicate 
that suffering by any and all means. In measuring the cost, we must, of course, evaluate 
each technological step on its own terms, but we can ill afford to ignore its place in the 
longer journey. For defensible step by defensible step, we can willingly walk to our own 
degradation. The road to Brave New World is paved with sentimentality - yes, even 
with love and charity. Have we enough sense to turn back?S2 
When all the dust settles, hasn't Kass, albeit in a cautious and pedagogically 
roundabout way, taken us back to the Vatican Instruction on Bioethics? Isn't 
what Kass ends up saying what the Magisterium says from the very beginning? 
Isn't Kass' reference to the wisdom in nature's design of the uniting of sex, love, 
and procreation in effect what Pope Paul VI, in Humanae Vitae, calls the design 
ordained by the Creator for the transmission of human life? Isn't Kass' careful 
weighing of the long term consequences of dismantling nature's design in effect a 
study of the real sanctions, discernible by unaided reason, for violating what the 
Magisterium calls the objective moral order? In short, doesn't Kass' reasoning 
make manifest the wisdom of the teaching of the Magisterium? 
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Close to the end of his argument, Leon Kass says: 
My point is almost certain to be misunderstood. I am not suggesting that one can be truly 
human only be engaging in procreation. I think there is a clear need for curtailing 
procreation, and I have no objections to the use of any and all contraceptive devices . .. 
My point is simply that there are more and less human ways of bringing a child into the 
world.s3 
How does Leon Kass want us to understand this statement? When he tells us 
that he has no objections to the use of any and all contraceptive devices, how can 
we not remember that this was his original posture toward both intramarital in 
vitro fertilization and artificial insemination by husband? And if Leon Kass insists 
that there are more and less human ways of bringing a child into the world, would 
he not also say that the same is true with regard to the regulation of human birth? 
Ifhis contemplation of nature's uniting love, sex, and procreation leads him to say 
that wisdom consists in not practicing in vitro fertilization, what more would he 
be led to say about the wisdom of contraception? 
However he would answer these questions - and I hope he does - having 
travelled with Leon Kass as guide, how could we possibly read Humanae Vitae 
and the Vatican Instruction on Bioethics with the eyes and "mind" of Lenina 
Crowne? More generally, how can we continue on the Baconian and Cartesian 
path ofleast resistance "comfortably" or without any second thought? And when 
we have those second thoughts, will we Catholics have the courage to reflect on 
our practice and recover our ability to listen to nature's design? 
Only the Creator knows. But one thing is for certain: thank God for Leon Kass. 
Appendix: The Hippocratic Oath54 
"I swear by Apollo Physician and Asclepius and Hygieia and Panaceia and all the gods and 
goddesses, making them my witnesses, that I will fulfill according to my ability and judgment this 
oath and this covenant: 
To hold the one who has taught me this art as equal to my parents and to live my life in 
partnership with him, and if he is in need of money to give him a share of mine, and to regard his 
offspring as equal to my brothers in male lineage and to teach them this art - if they desire to learn 
it - without fee and covenant; to give a share of precepts and oral instruction and all other learning 
to my sons and to the sons of him who has instructed me and to pupils who have signed the 
covenant and have taken an oath according to medical law, but to no one else. 
I will apply dietetic measures for the benefit of the sick according to my ability and judgment; I 
will keep them from harm ~d injustice. 
I will neither give a deadly' drug to anybody if asked for it, nor willI make a suggestion to this 
effect. Similarly I will not give to a woman an abortive remedy. In purity and holiness I will guard 
my life and my art. . 
I will not use the knife, not even on sufferers from stone, but will withdraw in favor of such men 
as are engaged in this work. 
Into whatever houses I may enter, I will come for the benefit of the sick, remaining clear of all 
voluntary injustice and of other mischief and of sexual deeds upon bodies of females and males, be 
they free or slave. 
Things I may see or hear in the course of the treatment or even outside of treatment regarding the 
life of human beings, things which one should never divulge outside, I will keep to myself holding 
such things unutterable [or 'shameful to be spoken']. 
If I fulfill this oath and do not violate it, may it be granted to me to enjoy life and art, being 
honored with fame among men for all time to come; if I transgress it and swear falsely, may the 
opposite of all this be my lot. 
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